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What are the implications for patient safety and
experience of a major healthcare IT breakdown?
A qualitative study
Arabella Scantlebury1 , L Sheard1, Cindy Fedell2 and J Wright2
Abstract
Introduction: To explore the impact of a three-week downtime to an electronic pathology system on patient safety and
experience.
Methods: Qualitative study consisting of semi-structured interviews and a focus group at a large NHS teaching hospital in
England. Participants included NHS staff (n¼ 16) who represented a variety of staff groups (doctors, nurses, healthcare
assistants) and board members. Data were collected 2–5months after the outage and were analysed thematically.
Results: We present the implications which the IT breakdown had for both patient safety and patient experience. Whilst
there was no actual recorded harm to patients during the crisis, there was strong and divided opinion regarding the
potential for a major safety incident to have occurred. Formal guidance existed to assist staff to navigate the outage but
there was predominantly a reliance on informal workarounds. Junior clinicians seemed to struggle without access to
routine blood test results whilst senior clinicians seemed largely unperturbed. Patient experience was negatively affected
due to the extensive wait time for manually processed diagnostic tests, increasing logistical problems for patients.
Conclusion: The potential negative consequences on patient safety and experience relating to IT failures cannot be under-
estimated. To minimise risks during times of crisis, clear communication involving all relevant stakeholders, and guidance
and management strategies that are agreed upon and communicated to all staff are recommended. To improve patient
experience flexible approaches to patient management are suggested.
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Introduction
In 2016, a large NHS teaching hospital in England
experienced a failure to its electronic pathology
system. At the time of the outage, pathology services
were provided by a neighbouring hospital. The outage
affected the neighbouring hospital’s electronic labora-
tory information system and so electronically transfer-
ring results between the two organisations was not
possible during the three-week outage. The disruption
caused was unprecedented, partly, because of the out-
ages duration, but also because it affected two large
NHS teaching hospitals, which are reliant on
pathology for a number of clinical services (e.g. trans-
fusion, microbiology). The outage therefore not only
placed strain across one organisation’s ability to
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provide clinical services, but an entire local health
community.
Over the last two decades, there has been a global
drive towards digitising healthcare.1 As a result, there
are a number of key clinical areas for which electronic
systems are integral to day-to-day patient management,
diagnosis and decision-making. For example, patholo-
gy and Picture Archiving and Communication Systems
(PACS).
As healthcare systems become more ‘digitised’,
organisations and individuals are required to change
how they work to integrate the use of technology and
are becoming increasingly dependent on technology to
deliver healthcare.2 However, no technology is 100%
reliable, and so it is important to understand what
happens when the technology that healthcare organisa-
tions, and professionals, have become so reliant on
fails. More specifically, what are the implications of
catastrophic IT failures to the safety of healthcare
and patient experience?
Existing evidence on e-health has focussed on its
implementation, and in particular, the potential for
electronic systems to improve the quality and safety
of healthcare.1,3–18 Much less attention, has been
given, to the potential negative impacts of e-health,19
with the effects of catastrophic IT downtimes on the
quality and safety of healthcare a particularly under-
researched area.2,20 When considering the patient
safety literature more broadly, there is a large interna-
tional evidence base on emergency preparedness and
response, however, few studies have explored the
impact of major crises on healthcare.21–24 Likewise,
UK policy has largely focussed on the potential bene-
fits of digitising healthcare and technology implemen-
tation.25–28 In 2017, a worldwide cyber-attack caused
disruption to over a third of NHS hospitals and
resulted in an independent report on the attack’s
impact being commissioned by the Department of
Health.29 Since the attack, the digital resilience of
NHS organisations has been high on the UK policy
agenda and local organisations have been urged to
improve their digital infrastructure and security.29
This paper does not aim to determine the technical
reasons behind the IT failure at the teaching hospital in
question, but aims to contribute to the limited evidence
surrounding the impact of major catastrophic events
on healthcare, by reporting on the impact of a major
IT power outage – a three-week downtime to an elec-
tronic pathology system – on a single NHS organisa-
tion. Through interviews and focus groups, we
captured the perspectives and experiences of board
members and clinical staff and aim to obtain an in-
depth understanding of the impact of the outage on
patient safety and experience. In doing so, we aim to
generate wider lessons that can be applied to
organisations during other rare catastrophic events
and promote sharing of lessons between organisations
during times of crisis.
Methods
Study design
A qualitative exploratory study comprising semi-
structured interviews and a focus group was adopted
to explore an organisation’s response to a pathology
system’s downtime at a NHS hospital. Data collection
took place between November 2016 and February
2017, approximately 2–5months after the pathology
system’s downtime. The study was designed in response
to a major healthcare crisis and so a flexible and prag-
matic approach to recruitment and data collection was
required. One of the challenges we faced was recruiting
staff to interviews at a time when the hospital was
experiencing unprecedented demand. To mitigate
against this, we chose to purposively interview key
informants who represented areas most affected by
the outage and we were mindful not to interview
more informants than necessary to reduce burden on
key clinical roles. Therefore, our sample was limited to
16 key clinicians and hospital board members, who rep-
resented a range of staff groups, grades and specialties.
Research governance approval was obtained from
the University of York Health Sciences Research
Governance Committee on 25 October 2016.
Setting and pathology system
The study was conducted at a large NHS foundation
trust in the England, which provides hospital services
to approximately 500,000 people and specialist services
to 1.1 million people.
At the time of the power outage, the hospital’s
pathology services were provided under contract with
another local NHS hospital – the host organisation.
The pathology service is an end-to-end service from
sample analysis to the provision of an electronic
result and covers all laboratory disciplines including:
biochemisty, blood sciences, blood transfusion, cellular
pathology, immunology and specialist tests. The system
routinely processes an estimated 2000 samples per day,
provides pathology services to over 60 General
Practices and is a tertiary service for specialist tests to
a wider population. To protect the anonymity of both
organisations more specific details of the pathology
system and dates for the outage are not provided.
Sampling and recruitment
We present data from the perspective of those at a
NHS organisation. Key members of the trust board
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were initially recruited as it was anticipated that they
would provide a unique perspective on the organisa-
tion’s response to the outage. At the end of each inter-
view, board members were asked to identify the clinical
areas that they felt were most affected during the
outage and provide the contact details of consultants
in these areas. We acknowledge the limitations to this
approach. However, this research was conducted in
direct response to a major crisis and so this was con-
sidered the most efficient recruitment method. Within
the wards that were identified, a purposive sampling
frame was adopted to ensure that a range of staff
groups and grades were recruited to understand their
perceptions and experiences of the outage and its per-
ceived impact.
Participants were recruited to interview via tele-
phone and email. Significant difficulty was encountered
in recruiting junior doctors to individual interviews and
so a focus group was conducted for these participants.
The focus group took place during the junior doctors’
lunch hour, with participants recruited via a junior
doctors’ WhatsApp group.
Participants
Sixteen participants consented and participated in the
research. Seven junior doctors participated in a focus
group and nine individual interviews were conducted
with three members of the trust board, three consul-
tants, one pathology consultant, one nurse and 1
Health Care Assistant/patient flow manager.
Participants represented a range of wards including:
oncology, cardiology, general surgery, Acute Medical
Unit (AMU), elderly care, pathology and intensive
care/anaesthesia.
Data collection
The focus group and interviews were conducted face-
to-face, were semi-structured and lasted between 17
and 57min. Two topic guides were devised; one for
interviews and one for the focus group. Topic guides
were developed by the research team and piloted with
the director of informatics at the study site (Appendix 1
and 2). During the interviews and focus group, partic-
ipants were asked about the organisational and clinical
response to the outage and its impact on the organisa-
tion, the local healthcare community and clinical prac-
tice. Interviews with members of the trust board were
more focussed on the organisational response and the
factors affecting this. Topic guides provided a frame-
work for data collection, however a flexible approach
to the format of topic guides and questions posed was
adopted to ensure participants could discuss issues they
felt were important. Written informed consent was
taken from all participants prior to each interview.
Analysis
Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verba-
tim. Analysis was facilitated by use of the qualitative
data management programme NVIVO (version 11). AS
conducted the analysis with regular discussions with LS
to discuss theme and sub-theme development. To
ensure that a systematic approach to analysis was
adopted, data were analysed using a thematic
approach, following the stages outlined by Braun
et al. (2006): detailed familiarisation with the data;
code and theme development and data reporting.30
Theme and sub-theme development was largely deduc-
tive based on a-priori themes relating to issues included
in the topic guide. An iterative approach to theme and
sub-development was then adopted to refine and re-
develop themes and sub-themes.
Results
First, we set the scene by reporting descriptively key
information that gives context to the outage. This is
necessary for readers to be able to understand the resul-
tant implications for patient safety and experience. All
the information we portray was uncovered from the
qualitative fieldwork and could be considered a
theme in its own right. For the sake of brevity and
concentration on our main findings of safety and expe-
rience, we have condensed this material into snapshots
that are pivotal to understanding the eye of the storm.
These are presented in Table 1.
What were the implications of the IT breakdown
for patient safety?
A formal internal review, which consisted of a review
of patient safety incidents reported on the hospital’s
electronic Datix system was conducted by the hospital’s
governance and risk team and concluded that no harm
resulted from the outage. The majority of participants
reported that they were not aware of any patient safety
incidents during the outage and considered patient flow
and delays to treatment and discharge to have been the
main areas of concern. Whilst there was largely no per-
ception of any ‘actual’ impact on safety, a number of
participants from medical wards felt that, particularly
at the beginning of the outage, that there was a poten-
tial for a major incident to occur, with this prevented
only by good luck and staff working additional hours.
Despite, the hospital’s internal review concluding that
there were no patient safety incidents reported during
the outage, junior doctors provided examples of
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situations where they felt patient safety had been, or
could have been, at risk. One example is that of time-
liness relating to microbiology results in order to know
if an infection is resistant to the antibiotic the patient
has been prescribed. When the IT system was down,
these checks did not always happen and a consultant
pathologist describes a situation which subsequently
occurred:
After that sort of chaos we had an untoward incident as
well where. . .because normally we would rely on IT sys-
tems to do a lot of integrity checks on the samples. . .But
unfortunately because it was just so chaotic and busy. . .the
patient was treated unnecessarily. . .luckily the patient
didn’t come to any harm but there could have been a seri-
ous untoward incident (Consultant pathologist)
In comparison to their medical counterparts, sur-
geons perceived there to be a minimal risk to patient
safety during the outage due to any potential issues
being either pre-empted or worked-around. This was
attributed largely to guidance that was developed by
the hospital board and senior clinical staff at the start
of the outage, which was then communicated to all
staff. The guidance enabled staff, through a flow
chart, to categorise cases into those that could proceed
and those that should be cancelled. Elective surgeries
and operations requiring blood transfusion were can-
celled unless they were life threatening. Priority was
given to emergency cases, cancer patients and cases
that had previously been cancelled.
There weren’t patient safety issues, because we pre-
empted them, so the issue with blood in particular we
would not have started a case that theoretically required
transfusion.” (Consultant surgeon)
In addition to formal guidance, staff developed their
own workarounds and methods for risk assessing sit-
uations, which where appropriate, enabled them to




The outage’s significance was perceived to be underestimated by the hospital both in terms of
its expected duration and potential impact. Participants felt that there was a delayed
response to the crisis, which had a ‘knock on effect’ on the hospital’s ability to manage the
situation throughout the outage. The initial underestimation of the outage’s significance was
perceived to be related to: communication issues between the hospital and the host orga-
nisation; the frequency of IT failures in the NHS and a perceived ‘weekend’ effect.
Crisis management
plan
At the time of the outage, there was no agreed hospital-wide crisis management plan. Board
members discussed how the organisation’s response was often iterative and reactive to the
situation and events. Staff discussed the difficulties of trying to define a crisis management
plan whilst doing the day job and how this was made more challenging by the organisation’s
initial underestimation of the outage’s significance and subsequent delayed response.
Reverting to paper When the outage occurred, the hospital reverted to a manual, paper-based pathology service,
which struggled to cope with the increased volume of work this brought. This was attributed
to the fact that pathology services have been reliant on IT systems for 30 years and also to the
specialised nature of pathology which made it difficult to provide additional staff during the




To cope with the reduced processing capacity and additional demand of manual processing,
wards and patients were identified which should be considered a priority. Critical areas were
considered those where processing time was integral to patient safety, such as the
Emergency Department(ED). Communication was issued to all clinical staff informing them
that they should only be issuing requests to pathology for urgent or emergency cases.
Additional staff and
resources
One of the consequences of reverting to a paper based system was that additional staff and
resources were required to be able to cope with the added strain. Whilst there was some
delay in making additional staff and resources available, staff acknowledged that when this
was in place, it greatly alleviated pressure on wards. Additionally, the team ethos and
willingness of staff from across the organisation to undertake administrative duties and work
additional hours was considered one of the most positive lessons learned.
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conduct operations safely. For example, operative lists
were re-organised, so that the patients, which did not
require blood products were conducted first.
Operations that required blood or blood products
were then scheduled for later in the day, to enable
time for blood to be sought. For emergency cases, or
comorbid patients, other tests (such as blood gas
machines), or where possible previous test results
were used as proxies for key information to enable
operations to proceed. Staff also highlighted the impor-
tance of communication and explained that for surgical
staff safety was, as usual, central to all discussions
when assessing the feasibility of cases.
“I think we’d have found workarounds, so for instance, if
I’d have needed to do a complex major urgently and need
that renal function, there would have been a blood ana-
lyser in the hospital somewhere that would have been able
to give us enough basic information for us to probably
proceed.” (Consultant surgeon).
Surgical staff considered decision making surround-
ing operations to be ‘easy’ as operations requiring
blood products would not proceed without blood
being available. However, for one surgeon the main
difficulties surrounded cases where it was unusual for
blood to be required, but there was a ‘theoretical risk of
haemorrhage.’ A number of participants also raised
concerns regarding the time taken to access blood
products during the outage, particularly for acute
cases, where it is difficult to predict when blood will
be required and delaying treatment can have negative
consequences for the patients. Limited access to micro-
biology also was perceived to have negative implica-
tions on safety. For instance, MRSA tests are
required prior to orthopaedic operations – delays to
microbiology services during the outage therefore
meant that risk assessment procedures were developed
to ensure the safety of orthopaedic operations. An
additional area of concern for surgical staff included
the impact of cancelling elective patients on their case-
load and hospital targets.
Many participants discussed the impact which the
outage had on clinical decision-making and its relation-
ship to patient safety. Opinion was often strong but
divided. Consultants were largely indifferent towards
having no access to routine blood tests during the
crisis and perceived this to have had limited impact
on their ability to manage patients and make clinical
decisions. Whilst consultants acknowledged that
having no access to routine blood tests was associated
with ‘the odd risk’, this was considered to be counter-
balanced by the fact that clinicians should not be reli-
ant on blood results and should be able to use their
clinical judgement, the patient’s history and other
clinical tests when making decisions and managing
patients. A number of consultants attributed their
indifference to the fact that whilst training as junior
doctors ‘large batteries of tests’ were not available
and so the outage, has required them to go back to
using ‘old fashioned clinical skills.’ Comparisons were
also made to the Junior Doctors’ strike, during which a
number of consultants felt a more streamlined service
and more prompt decisions were made, despite less
resource being available. However, it was acknowl-
edged that as consultants they have the authority to
say that certain investigations are not required and
they are more confident at ‘sniffing out trouble.’
When discussing the over reliance of clinicians and in
particular junior doctors on ordering batteries of tests,
consultants raised concerns that medicine has recently
become protocol driven and encourages over-
investigation. This was perceived to have caused med-
icine to become overcautious with doctors concerned
about the prospect of being blamed if a patient came to
harm and all available tests had not been ordered.
There was clearly pandemonium over wherever it
occurred, but my initial reaction was, ah, well we’ll just
have to go back to a bit of clinical intuition and common
sense, rather than doing the serum rhubarb every day on
5,000 different patients, we might have to start using our
brains and judgement. (Consultant surgeon)
Contrastingly, junior doctors discussed how not all
consultants were confident in making decisions without
routine blood tests being available, with some consul-
tants considered much more risk averse than others.
Junior doctors and the health care assistant also
emphasised the importance of having access to blood
results for clinical decision making and patient man-
agement and provided a number of examples to illus-
trate this.
A lot of our patients will have abnormal blood tests that
can be normal for them. There were some people that
were for example, receiving intravenous fluids because
they have a normal renal function, we have no way of
knowing whether that was their normal or whether that
was a new thing or not. So I think people quite possible
got treatment that they didn’t necessarily require because
we tried to be as safe as possible, because we didn’t have
that information from the trends. (Junior doctor)
What were the implications of the IT breakdown
for patient experience?
A number of participants discussed how when a hospi-
tal is in crisis, the numbers of patients attending the
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hospital does not reduce and so inevitably, there was a
perceived impact on patient flow and experience. There
was a perceived slower throughput of patients through
ED and increased time to discharge due to the added
time it took to process results manually.
There was no seating area, it was awful, and people were
sat on the floor just awaiting blood results, and just for
the patient flow as well, it hindered it as it came to a
standstill, not just here but on the downstream wards and
people in A&E so you’ve got your 4 hour targets so gen-
erally this is something that you would get back in that
target period but obviously due to the delay it had a
knock on effect so you were getting unnecessary admis-
sions to the wards because of breach times, because you
didn’t have the results. (Health care assistant and
patient flow manager)
The impact of the outage on patient flow, and con-
sequently on patient experience, was considered a par-
ticular problem for staff working in ambulatory care.
This was attributed to patients being streamed inappro-
priately from ED to ambulatory care to increase flow
and avoid breaching ED waiting times, but also to the
added time taken to manually process blood results.
Given that waiting times for blood tests were between
6-8 hours, managing patient frustration was vital and
so staff in the ambulatory care unit established a
number of workarounds to improve patient flow and
experience during the outage. Staff ensured that
patients were kept informed of waiting times, encour-
aged patients to make any child care or transport
arrangements necessary and where appropriate, offered
patients alternatives to waiting on wards. For example,
staff offered to call patients when they received their
results, providing them with the opportunity to go
home or wait in the hospital’s cafe as opposed to on
the ward. The ambulatory care unit also stopped
accepting GP admissions at 4 pm during the crisis as
staff knew there would be insufficient time to process
the patient’s results. These patients were, where clini-
cally appropriate advised to return the next day.
As soon as they came in on the admission, we made all
our staff members say “all our systems are down, nor-
mally you would wait up to 2 hours, it can be up to a 6-
8 hour wait” so if you have any children you need to plan
for, picking them up etc. (Ambulatory care unit Nurse)
An additional problem for patient experience related
to situations where blood tests were repeated for the
same patient. For example, as blood tests requested by
the GP were not prioritised, a proportion of these may
have exceeded the length of time for which they can be
stored before the test would have to be repeated and
the patient recalled.
Discussion
Our qualitative study uncovered the implications for
patient safety and experience that arose from the cata-
strophic outage of a hospital’s pathology IT system.
Whilst there was an overriding perception that no
actual harm occurred to patients, there was divided
opinion about the potential for a major safety incident
to occur. Formal guidance existed to assist staff to nav-
igate the outage but there was predominantly a reliance
on informal workarounds. Junior clinicians seemed to
struggle without access to routine blood test results
whilst senior clinicians seemed largely unperturbed.
The outage saw patient experience being negatively
affected with an extensive wait time for manually proc-
essed diagnostic tests, and the associated logistical
issues for patients that accompanied this.
Despite large parts of Western healthcare systems
being dependent on IT for their delivery, very little is
known about how healthcare organisations respond to,
or are affected by, major IT failures. The majority of
existing evidence surrounding e-health focusses on the
perceived or potential benefits of digitised
healthcare.1,3–18 Given the lack of literature about IT
failures, perhaps the only parallel literature relates to
emergency preparedness and response to crisis situa-
tions. A pertinent example is that of a Norwegian
research team who explored the determinants for the
success of a single EDs response to a terrorist attack.21
The authors conclude that preparedness, competence
and crisis management built on empowerment enables
healthcare workers to trust themselves and each other
to make professional decisions and creative improvisa-
tions in an unpredictable situation. This to some extent
corresponds with the findings of our study, where par-
ticipants attributed the organisations initial underesti-
mation of the outage’s significance and lack of agreed
hospital-wide crisis management plan to have resulted
in perceived negative implications to patient safety and
experience.21
The incident which this paper is based on could be
viewed as isolated. However, unfortunate but large
scale attacks on IT systems across the world have in
recent years seen the NHS become a prime target. In
May 2017, a worldwide cyber-attack dubbed
WannaCry targeted Microsoft Windows operating sys-
tems and the NHS was one of its main victims. During
the attack, a third of NHS trusts were affected with
around 19,000 appointments and 6912 operations can-
celled.29 In 2018, the UK Department of Health
commissioned an independent report on the scale of
the into the Wanacry cyber-attack and found that
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large scale IT vulnerabilities were and are still resident
across most of the NHS estate.29 Whilst, the
WannaCry cyber-attack is aetiologically different to
the pathology IT outage we describe in this paper it
is analogous, not in scale but in the disruption and
impact that it had on patients. Additionally, the
Wanacry cyber-attack has led to a growing awareness
of the dependence of healthcare on IT and technology
failures being high on the English NHS policy agenda.
As IT becomes more central to healthcare it is nec-
essary for the (potential) risks to patient safety to be
made explicit so that lessons can be learned from
impromptu organisational responses to unplanned IT
catastrophes. This includes an examination of the fac-
tors which affected an organisations ability to respond
in this time of crisis. To this end, hospitals may wish to
look to the safety management literature (Hollnagel
et al., 2015).31 In our case study, it could be argued
that the organisation’s response was focussed around
a ‘Safety 1’ approach where it is presumed that things
go wrong because of detectible failures with manage-
ment approaches based on identifying the causes and
contributory factors of these failures. In our study, the
organisation’s crisis management approach was largely
based around identifying the problem ‘the outage’ and
trying to mitigate any adverse effects it may have
through centralised methods of crisis management
such as hospital-wide communications and ad-hoc
crisis management plans. There has however been a
relatively recent shift within the resilience literature,
which calls for organisations to adopt a Safety II
approach and a resilient healthcare view (Hollnagel
et al., 2015).31 This approach recognises that given
the inherent complexity of healthcare systems, treat-
ing them as either ‘functioning or not’ as in a Safety I
approach is unrealistic and that in reality healthcare
systems work safely by individuals making various
adjustments and adaptations in order to match cur-
rent conditions. Applying this to crisis management,
requires organisations to explore, during and not only
retrospectively after a crisis has happened, what is
going right, how things work and to manage and
foster performance variability (Braithwaite et al.,
2015).32 For example, in our study we found exam-
ples of how staff and wards had adapted to new ways
of working during the outage, albeit to varying
degrees of success. Adopting a Safety II approach
would require organisations to explore these in
more detail and focus their response around these
positive adaptations.
We also propose the following, more specific recom-
mendations for hospitals to consider when preparing
for potential technology downtimes that are based on
our study’s findings (Table 2).
Table 2. Recommendations.
Recommendations
Role-play Traditionally, informatics departments have focussed on ensuring that IT systems are fully func-
tional and available on a 24-7 basis. However, failures and ‘cyber-attacks’ are inevitable and so
there is a need to ensure that hospitals are properly prepared, to ensure they are able to
respond effectively. To achieve this, services will need to be deliberately ‘taken down’ to allow




During the outage, staff working in areas where clear guidance and plans had been implemented
and communicated to all staff (e.g. surgical wards) were of the opinion that there was a minimal
risk to safety. To minimise risk and ensure staff perceive the environment in which they are
working to be safe, clinical and managerial staff should work together to develop strategies for
ensuring patient safety is not compromised. This may include: agreed workarounds (e.g. use of
proxy tests to indicate where procedures can go ahead), developing decision trees and guidance
for prioritising certain patients and procedures and holding regular meetings and/or safety




Clear communication and involvement of all relevant stakeholders when responding to a crisis is
key to ensuring that the potential scale of the problem is understood and management plans are
implemented as intended. Clear communication between staff and patients is also important for
optimising patient experience. In our study participants discussed how being transparent with
patients from the outset about the outage and its potential impact on their care was essential to
patient management. Adopting a flexible approach to patient management and offering alter-
natives, such as waiting at home rather than on wards, may help to reduce potential negative
impacts on patient flow and patient experience.
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Implications for further research
The digitisation of healthcare services will undoubtedly
bring benefits. However, it is important to understand
the potential risks of digitising health services and in
particular the impact of downtimes on patient safety
and experience. Future research will need to utilise a
range of observational and qualitative methods to
address this evidence gap. More specifically, qualitative
research exploring the potential risks of digitising
health services and ways to mitigate against any nega-
tive impacts on patient safety and experience is recom-
mended. Quantitative research to determine the
impact of downtimes on key safety and performance
indicators, would be of benefit, with quasi-
experimental designs considered the optimum method
of achieving this.
Strengths and limitations
This study adds to a limited evidence base that has
reported on how healthcare organisations respond to
crisis, particularly catastrophic IT failures. The purpo-
sive sampling frame ensured that despite the challenges
of recruiting participants to qualitative interviews
during times of crisis a comprehensive range of views
on the impact and organisation’s response to the
outage are represented. The study’s main limitation is
that as a case study, the findings represent the views of
clinical and non-clinical staff from across a single large
inner-city NHS hospital.
We chose not to include the patient perspective. This
was a deliberate decision as many patients were
unaware of the outage, and with the hospitals crisis
management aimed at containing the outage, we did
not want to raise its profile and increase patient anxiety
by promoting our study. Our data was collected from
November 2016 to February 2017 and so its current
relevance may be questioned. However, given the lim-
ited evidence base that exists on crisis management and
the pressure on healthcare organisations to become
digitised globally it is likely that some of the lessons
and experiences reported here will be of use to other
healthcare organisations, preparing for or experiencing
catastrophic IT failures. Equally, some of the lessons
here (i.e. robust crisis management plans, and pre-
paredness) are likely to be transferable to other crisis
that are not related to technology failures. This is dem-
onstrated in the applicability of the study’s findings to
the work of Brandrud et al. (2017).21
Conclusion
This study identified that catastrophic IT failures are
associated with a perceived elevated risk to patient
safety and negative impacts on patient experience.
The potential risks of digitising healthcare is an
under-researched area. Future mixed methods research
should be prioritised to quantify the potential risks of
digitising healthcare and identify ways to mitigate
against this. This research also provides valuable les-
sons which may influence how hospitals prepare for
unexpected technology downtimes. Given the interna-
tional pressure on hospitals to become digitised, these
lessons are particularly relevant.
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